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THE NEED TO CODIFY ROE V. WADE: A CASE FOR NATIONAL 
ABORTION LEGISLATION 
 
Kathryn N. Peachman† 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
Forty-six years ago, the Supreme Court ruled that a woman had a fundamental 
legal right to decide whether to end her pregnancy under substantive due process 
protection.  Yet today, that right sometimes appears to remain no more solidified than 
it did in 1973 with the decision of Roe v. Wade.  This country has remained extremely 
divided on the issue of abortion, and courts and state legislatures continue to erode 
the effectiveness of the right given by Roe and limit the opportunities women have 
to exercise control over their own bodies.  There is perhaps only a handful of political 
issues that create more intense debate and emotional rise in Americans than abortion.  
When asked whether you consider yourself pro-choice or pro-life, a Gallup poll from 
May 2018 found the country was split evenly: 48% of people surveyed identified as 
pro-choice and 48% identified as pro-life.1 
However, when we look beyond the labels of pro-choice and pro-life and 
consider the issue on a spectrum that cannot be simply black and white, opinion polls 
tell a slightly different story.  In 2018, a Pew Research Center poll on Public Opinion 
on Abortion found that 58% of American adults believe abortion should be legal in 
all or most cases.2  The same Gallup poll from May 2018 found that 79% of American 
adults believe abortion should be legal under some circumstances.3  When society is 
forced to think about abortion beyond a simplistic nature and consider its complexity, 
we find that there is much less agreement within each party.  Issues are only as 
complex as we allow them to be.  For an issue that raises questions regarding life and 
death, bodily autonomy, legal rights and equal protection of women, and life-altering 
consequences for parents and children, it deserves to be an issue that we examine 
with the utmost attention and scientific understanding. 
With the October 2018 confirmation of Justice Brett Kavanaugh, who is surely a 
reliable anti-abortion vote, there is perhaps no more pressing time than now for 
Congress to pass legislation that reflects America’s opinion about abortion, before 
the issue reaches the Supreme Court.  While the Court has a historical record in 
                                                          
†  J.D. Candidate, Notre Dame Law School, 2020; B.A. Political Science and History, Fordham Univer-
sity, 2015.  I would like to thank the Notre Dame Journal of Legislation for their editing assistance and hard 
work.  I would also like to thank my family, especially my parents, Kathleen and Kenneth, for their endless 
support and belief in me.  Lastly, I want to thank all the strong women in my family, who have shown me how 
to live gracefully and fearlessly. 
1  Abortion, GALLUP, https://news.gallup.com/poll/1576/abortion.aspx (last visited Mar. 24, 2019). 
2  Public Opinion on Abortion: Views on abortion 1995-2018, PEW RESEARCH CTR., (Oct. 25, 2018), 
http://www.pewforum.org/fact-sheet/public-opinion-on-abortion/. 
3  GALLUP, supra note 1. 
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consistently upholding the ultimate holding of Roe over time, the majority of cases 
regarding abortion that reach the Supreme Court leave the Court closely divided, with 
many limiting the effectiveness and scope of Roe.  Outside the courts, laws across 
the country, sometimes called TRAP laws (Targeted Regulation of Abortion 
Providers), impose strict regulations on abortion clinics that are, more often than not, 
arbitrary and medically unnecessary.  These TRAP laws are essentially implemented 
to close abortion clinics and make it as difficult as possible to provide abortion 
services.  There are currently seven states that have only one abortion clinic in the 
entire state, presenting burdensome challenges for a woman in need of an abortion.4  
Because of this, it is essential that Congress take legislative action on this issue, 
particularly because regulating abortion is an action more rightfully held by Congress 
and not the Supreme Court in our federal system.  Separation of powers does not 
allow the judicial branch to legislate or create public policy.  The American public 
should not be satisfied with national abortion policy coming from the Supreme Court, 
which is isolated from public opinion, cannot be held politically accountable in 
elections, and consists only of a nine-member body appointed for life. 
This Note will examine the need to codify Roe v. Wade in federal legislation that 
will cement a woman’s right to obtain an abortion, while allowing for common sense 
restrictions on that right.  Common sense restrictions include a ban on abortion after 
twenty-two weeks, but with the option for women to access abortion beyond twenty-
two weeks in specific, limited circumstances, such as life and health dangers for the 
mother and serious fetal health and development defects.  Section I discusses the 
historical context of abortion and the Supreme Court’s abortion jurisprudence.  
Section II explores the general modern justifications for abortion and why the country 
cannot turn back the clock and make the procedure illegal.  The true starting point is 
thus where we must start within the abortion debate: answering the question of when 
life begins.  Section III will specifically examine two failed pieces of federal abortion 
legislation: the Freedom of Choice Act and the Pain-Capable Unborn Child 
Protection Act.  This Note will argue that by incorporating aspects from both of these 
bills into a common-sense compromise, it is more likely to pass in Congress.  This 
Section will also discuss the constitutionality of federal abortion legislation and the 
specific wording of the proposed legislation.  This Note concludes by discussing the 
importance of solidifying a woman’s right to personal liberty and bodily autonomy 
while balancing the federal interest in protecting the potential life of a fetus.  
Ultimately, abortion legislation must recognize the historical, social, and economic 
need to control reproduction, which arises not just from a woman’s biological 
capacity to bear children, but from the life-changing consequences of motherhood 
and childrearing. 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
4  Sasha Ingber, 1 Abortion Clinic Remains Open in Missouri, Following New State Requirements, NPR 
(Oct. 3, 2018), https://www.npr.org/2018/10/03/654030995/one-abortion-clinic-remains-open-in-missouri-fol-
lowing-new-state-requirements.  The six states currently that have only one abortion clinic are Kentucky, West 
Virginia, Wyoming, South Dakota, North Dakota, Missouri, and Mississippi. 
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I. HISTORICAL AND JURISPRUDENTIAL CONSIDERATIONS 
 
A. THE HISTORICAL PRACTICE OF ABORTION 
 
The need for women to control their reproductive lives is not a recent 
development.5  Though opponents often argue as if abortion is a modern consequence 
of feminism, increased promiscuity, or lack of societal morality, abortion has been 
and will continue to be an important part of women’s health care, regardless of its 
legal status.  Generations of women spanning hundreds of years have sought to 
control their reproductive lives, and abortion is one means of doing so. 
The American common law attitude toward abortion was generally less 
restrictive and laws were “grounded in the female experience of their own bodies.”6  
Abortions were illegal only after “quickening,” or the moment a pregnant woman 
begins to feel fetal movements which occurs at approximately the fourth month of a 
pregnancy.  Quickening was considered a defining moment in a pregnancy, and once 
quickening occurred, “women recognized a moral obligation to carry the fetus to 
term.”7  The fetus was regarded as part of the mother before quickening and its 
destruction was not considered morally problematic.  Abortion "was neither morally 
nor legally wrong in the eyes of the vast majority of Americans."8  Prior to 
quickening, the majority belief was that a human life did not exist.9 
Further, the common law history of the criminal status and punishment for 
abortion has been doubted.  Though an early opinion in the thirteenth century was 
that abortion after quickening was homicide, “the later and predominant view […] 
has been that it was, at most, a lesser offense.”10  Later scholars found that abortion 
after quickening was not murder, though “a great misprision” to be considered 
manslaughter.11  However, a more modern examination of these viewpoints seems to 
reveal that even post-quickening abortion was never established as a common-law 
crime.12  Ultimately, the Court in Roe concluded that it was “doubtful that abortion 
                                                          
5  See JOHN RIDDLE, CONTRACEPTION AND ABORTION FROM THE ANCIENT WORLD TO THE RENAISSANCE 
(1992) (Women from ancient Egyptian times to the fifteenth century regulated fertility using an extensive phar-
macopoeia of herbal abortifacients and contraceptives). 
6  LESLIE J. REAGAN, WHEN ABORTION WAS A CRIME: WOMEN, MEDICINE, AND LAW IN THE UNITED 
STATES, 1867-1973, 8 (1996). 
7  Id. at 9. 
8  Tracy A. Thomas, Misappropriating Women's History in the Law and Politics of Abortion, 36 SEATTLE 
U. L. REV. 1, 21 (2012), (quoting JAMES C. MOHR, ABORTION IN AMERICA: THE ORIGINS AND EVOLUTION OF 
NATIONAL POLICY 5 (1978)). 
9  REAGAN, supra note 6, at 8. 
10  Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 134–35, n.2 (1973) (citing 2 H. BRACTON, DE LEGIBUS ET CONSUETU-
DINIBUS ANGLIAE 279 (T. Twiss ed. 1879) (“Bracton took the position that abortion by blow or poison was 
homicide ‘if the foetus be already formed and animated, and particularly if it be animated.’”). 
11  Roe, 410 U.S. at 136 (“In a frequently cited passage, Coke took the position that abortion of a woman 
‘quick with child’ is ‘a great misprision, and no murder.’). 
12  Id. (citing CC Means, Jr., The Phoenix of Abortional Freedom: Is a Penumbral or Ninth-Amendment 
Right About to Arise from the Nineteenth-Century Legislative Ashes of a Fourteenth-Century Common-Law 
Liberty?, 17 N.Y.L. F. 335 (1971)) (“Coke, who himself participated as an advocate in an abortion case in 1601, 
may have intentionally misstated the law.  The author even suggests a reason: Coke's strong feelings against 
abortion, coupled with his determination to assert common-law (secular) jurisdiction to assess penalties for an 
offense that traditionally had been an exclusively ecclesiastical or canon-law crime.”). 
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was ever firmly established as a common-law crime even with respect to the 
destruction of a quick fetus.”13  
The legislative history of abortion also seems to lean towards greater protection 
of women’s autonomy, as the earliest efforts to regulate abortion centered on 
“concerns about poisoning, not morality, religion, or politics.”14  The first statutes 
regulating abortion, passed in the 1820s and 1830s, were actually poison-control 
laws.15  The purpose of these laws was to ban the sale of commercial abortifacients, 
not abortion itself, and were designed to protect pregnant women taking the drugs, 
which often killed the women who took them.16  The concern was not about abortion, 
but about the commercialization of these abortifacients, which were advertised in 
newspapers and openly available for purchase.  The aim of these regulations was to 
protect women from injury, not to punish them. 
 
B. THE MOVEMENT AGAINST ABORTION AND FOUNDATIONS FOR ROE 
 
The movement toward prohibiting abortions started from a surprising source.  
The American Medical Association (“AMA”) was founded in 1857 and “initiated a 
crusade to make abortion at every stage of pregnancy illegal.”17  The reasons for this 
movement are important to analyze.  First, abortion created competition between 
midwives and physicians, who desired control and power within the medical 
community.  The AMA hoped to give exclusive rights to control and practice 
medicine to “regulars”, or certified physicians, and the “best way to accomplish their 
goal was to eliminate one of the principle procedures that kept [their] competitors in 
business.”18  Additionally, this movement coincided with the fight by male general 
physicians to keep women out of medical schools and hospitals.19  The main force 
behind the AMA’s anti-abortion movement was Dr. Horatio Storer, a graduate of 
Harvard Medical School and a practicing gynecologist, who opposed women’s 
entrance to Harvard Medical School and stated “the true wife [did not seek] undue 
power in public life … [or] privileges not her own.”20  The anti-abortion campaign 
by the AMA, though outwardly concerned with the morality around abortion, was 
“antifeminist at its core” and more concerned with the shifting dynamics of women 
in society.21 
Additionally, concerns over immigration and declining birth rates of white 
                                                          
13  Roe, 410 U.S. at 136. 
14  Jessica Ravitz, The surprising History of Abortion in the United States, CNN (June 27, 2016), 
https://www.cnn.com/2016/06/23/health/abortion-history-in-united-states/index.html. 
15  REAGAN, supra note 6, at 10. 
16  Id. 
17  Id. 
18  History of Abortion, NAT’L ABORTION FED’N, https://prochoice.org/education-and-advocacy/about-
abortion/history-of-abortion/ (“Rather than openly admitting to such motivations, the newly formed American 
Medical Association (AMA) argued that abortion was both immoral and dangerous.  By 1910 all but one state 
had criminalized abortion except where necessary, in a doctor’s judgment, to save the woman’s life.  In this 
way, legal abortion was successfully transformed into a “physicians-only” practice.”). 
19  REAGAN, supra note 6, at 11. 
20  Id. 
21  Id. 
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Protestant women may also have fueled the movement towards anti-abortion during 
the mid-nineteenth century.  The practice of abortion by middle-class women 
“generated anxieties among American men of the same class.”22  Opponents of 
abortion grew concerned that immigrants would out populate native-born white 
Protestants. Dr. Storer even stated “Shall [our country] be filled by our own children 
or by those of aliens?  This is a question our women must answer; upon their loins 
depends the future destiny of the nation.”23  Ultimately, this hostility to immigrants, 
Catholics, and people of color helped fuel the campaign to criminalize abortion, as 
“white male patriotism demanded that maternity be enforced among white Protestant 
women.”24 
To enforce the anti-abortion movement, men condemned women for having 
abortions and blamed female doctors and midwives for the practice.  The AMA 
campaign “developed the caricature of the married woman who willfully aborted 
pregnancy and rejected the domestic and maternal role men had constructed for 
her.”25  The woman who sought an abortion was portrayed as selfish, frivolous, 
dangerous, and destructive for rejecting her social duty to bear children.26  They 
attempted to destroy the idea of quickening which, dependent on female self-
diagnosis and judgment, gave women the power over male physicians.  Dr. Storer 
argued that quickening could not be used as an indicator of fetal life, demeaning 
women’s perceptions by joking that many women never quicken at all, “though their 
children are born living.”27  Physicians successfully implemented criminal abortion 
laws by appealing to white, native-born males’ anti-women prejudices. 
By 1880, most states passed laws restricting abortions, with limited exceptions 
for the health and safety of the mother’s life.28  The Comstock Law, passed in 1873 
during an anti-vice campaign lead by Anthony Comstock, characterized abortion and 
birth control as obscene, and made it a federal offense to disseminate contraceptives 
or provide services across state lines.29  However, the illegalization of abortion did 
not make the procedure disappear.  In fact, illegalization arguably did not succeed in 
significantly decreasing the number of women who sought to obtain abortions.  
Practitioners continued to offer abortion procedures, just behind closed doors in 
dangerous conditions.30  This practice continued for decades.  In fact, by the "early 
1960s, [illegal] abortion-related deaths accounted for nearly half, or 42.1%, of the 
total maternal mortality in New York City.”31  From the 1880s until 1973, many 
women were harmed by these “back-alley abortions”, disproportionately hurting 
                                                          
22  Id. 
23  Id. 
24  Id. 
25  Thomas, supra note 8, at 23. 
26  Id. 
27  REAGAN, supra note 6, at 12. 
28  Id. 
29  Comstock Act, 17 Stat. 598 (1873); see also Margaret A. Blanchard & John E. Semonche, Anthony 
Comstock and his Adversaries: The Mixed Legacy of this Battle for Free Speech, 11 COMM. L. & POL’Y 317 
(2006). 
30  REAGAN, supra note 6, at 11. 
31  Id. 
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lower income and minority women.32 
By the mid-twentieth century, the foundations were being laid for the Supreme 
Court’s decision in Roe.  In 1965, the Supreme Court held in Griswold v. Connecticut 
that a state statute prohibiting the use of birth control measures by married couples 
was an unconstitutional invasion of the right of privacy.33  Though the Constitution 
does not explicitly grant a right to privacy, the Supreme Court viewed prior cases as 
creating various zones of privacy and penumbras of protection from government 
interference.34  The Court also adopted a broad definition of liberty, finding that 
liberty: 
 
[D]enotes not merely freedom from bodily restraint, but also the right of 
the individual to contract, to engage in any of the common occupations of 
life, to acquire useful knowledge, to marry, establish a home and bring up 
children, to worship God according to the dictates of his own conscience, 
and generally to enjoy those privileges long recognized at common law as 
essential to the orderly pursuit of happiness by free men.35 
 
In a series of decisions prior to Roe, the Court extended this rationale to include 
the right to marry,36 the right to parental decisions regarding their children’s 
education,37 and the right to make personal decisions about procreation.38  These 
cases helped lay the foundation for the privacy rights inherent in women making 
decisions about their reproductive lives, sexuality, bodily autonomy, and ultimately, 
the decision to terminate a pregnancy. 
 
C. THE SUPREME COURT’S ABORTION JURISPRUDENCE 
 
Though many consider Roe v. Wade to be “judicial activism at either its 
enlightened best or its high-handed worst,” placing Roe within the historical context 
of the time shows that it may have just been a logical response to the growing 
concerns regarding illegal abortions.39  Rather than creating a court-sponsored 
legislative enactment, the Supreme Court may have just responded to a long build-
up of necessary societal change, unable or unwilling to be addressed by Congress.  
                                                          
32  Id. See also Erwin Chemerinsky & Michele Goodwin, Abortion: A Woman’s Private Choice, 95 TEX. 
L. REV. 1189 (2017). 
33  Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965). 
34  Id. 
35  Linda L. Schlueter, 40th Anniversary of Roe v. Wade: Reflections Past, Present and Future, 40 OHIO 
N.U. L. REV. 105, 119 (2013). 
36  Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967). 
37  Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390 (1923); Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510 (1925). 
38  Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438, 453 (1972) (“If the right of privacy means anything, it is the right 
of the individual, married or single, to be free from unwarranted governmental intrusion into matters so funda-
mentally affecting a person as the decision whether to bear or beget a child.”). 
39  Katha Pollitt, Abortion in American History, THE ATLANTIC (May 1997), https://www.theatlan-
tic.com/magazine/archive/1997/05/abortion-in-american-history/376851/. 
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As a result, women were left unable to safely access a medical procedure guaranteed 
to them by the contours of privacy embedded in our Constitution.  It is in this context 
that twenty-one-year-old Norma McCorvey, better known by her legal pseudonym 
“Jane Roe,” discovered she was pregnant with her third child. 
 
1. ROE V. WADE 
 
The Texas statutes at issue in Roe made it a crime to “procure an abortion” except 
when necessary for the purpose of saving the life of the mother.  Roe, a single mother 
of two children residing in Dallas, Texas, alleged that the Texas statutes were 
unconstitutional.  She represented not just herself, but all women who wanted 
abortions but could not obtain them legally or safely.  In a 7-2 decision, the Court 
found the Texas statutes violated a woman’s constitutional right of privacy, which is 
implicit in the liberty guarantee of the due process clause of the Fourteenth 
Amendment, which guarantees no state shall “deprive any person of life, liberty, or 
property, without due process of law.”40  
The Court began its analysis with a summary of the privacy rights it recognized 
as existing under the Constitution, and found the right to privacy to be broad enough 
to encompass a woman’s decision whether or not to terminate a pregnancy.41  
However, the Court also recognized the balance of state interests in regulating 
abortion, which include safeguarding women’s health and protecting potential life.  
Ultimately, the Court concluded that “the right of personal privacy includes the 
abortion decision, but that this right is not unqualified and must be considered against 
important state interests in regulation.”42 
This conclusion was then applied directly to the stages of pregnancy in order to 
weigh or balance the woman’s rights with State interests.  The Roe holding can be 
summarized as follows: 
 
(1) Prior to the end of the first trimester, the decision to obtain an abortion 
must be left to medical professionals; 
(2) After the first trimester, the State may choose to regulate abortion in 
ways that are reasonably related to its interest in promoting the health of 
the mother; 
(3) Post-viability, the State may choose to regulate or prohibit abortion in 
its interest of protecting the potentiality of human life, except where it 
is necessary to preserve the life or health of the mother.43 
 
The Roe opinion gave the country this basic framework, but left out the contours 
and details that have become the subject of more regulations and restrictions.  Though 
Roe remains the country’s seminal case on abortion, the confirmation that women 
may legally obtain an abortion was just the beginning of a long battle over abortion 
rights. 
                                                          
40  U.S. CONST. amend. XIV. 
41  Roe, 410 U.S. at 154. 
42  Id. 
43  Id. 
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2. PLANNED PARENTHOOD V. CASEY 
 
The reasoning of the Court in Roe was altered in the 1992 case Planned 
Parenthood v. Casey, though the Court upheld and reaffirmed the essential holding 
in Roe.44  Although Roe is the case cited most frequently in conversations about 
abortion rights and the Supreme Court, the holding in Casey is what currently 
controls, and therefore merits a more thorough examination.  The Casey opinion is 
more comprehensive in its analysis of what the right to an abortion entails, and takes 
a more middle-ground approach in determining how to protect the rights of both the 
woman and the fetus. 
At issue in Casey were five provisions enacted in Pennsylvania that placed 
various requirements on women prior to obtaining an abortion.  These restrictions 
included a spousal notification for married women, parental notification for minors 
(but with a judicial bypass alternative), abortion provider requirements regarding 
consent and the mandatory information to be given to the woman, and certain 
reporting requirements on facilities providing abortion services.45 
Writing for the majority of the 5-4 decision, Justice Kennedy explained that “men 
and women of good conscience can disagree … about the profound moral and 
spiritual implications of terminating a pregnancy, even at its earliest stage,” but 
personal feelings cannot control the court’s decision.46  “Our obligation”, Justice 
Kennedy wrote, “is to define the liberty of all, not to mandate our own moral code.”47  
The Court reasoned that while the government may generally enact laws where 
reasonable people may disagree, it cannot do so when that choice intrudes upon a 
protected liberty.  The Fourteenth Amendment protects those matters “involving the 
most intimate and personal choices a person may make in a lifetime, choices central 
to dignity and autonomy” and “at the heart of liberty, is the right to define one’s own 
concept of existence, of meaning, of the universe, and of the mystery of human 
life.”48 
Immediately, the Court disregarded those arguments calling for the overruling of 
Roe.  The Court stated that “any reservations any of us may have in reaffirming the 
central holding of Roe are outweighed by the explication of individual liberty we 
have given combined with the force of stare decisis.”49  After almost twenty years, 
the Court determined that the liberty guarantee given to women in Roe prevailed, 
though limited by the ability and option for states to further their own interests in 
protecting life to some degree.  
The Court strongly affirmed three of Roe’s bedrock principles.  First, a woman 
has the right “to choose to have an abortion before viability and to obtain it without 
undue interference from the State.”50  Second, states retain the power to restrict 
                                                          
44  Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S 833 (1992). 
45  Id. at 843. 
46  Id. at 851. 
47  Id. 
48  Id. 
49  Id. 
50  Id. at 846. 
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abortions after fetal viability so long as the law “contains exceptions for pregnancies 
which endanger the woman’s life or health.”51  Third, the State has “legitimate 
interests from the outset of the pregnancy in protecting the health of the woman and 
the life of the fetus.”52 
However, the Court provided clarification where Roe was in need of it.  The 
Court thus rejected the trimester framework taken in Roe and replaced it with the 
viability test.53  As noted in Roe, “the concept of viability … is the time at which 
there is a realistic possibility of maintaining and nourishing a life outside the womb, 
so that the independent existence of the second life can in reason and all fairness be 
the object of state protection that now overrides the rights of the woman.”54  Though 
legislatures may draw lines without justification, the Court “must justify the lines we 
draw.  And there is no line other than viability which is more workable.”55 
Ultimately, the Casey Court found some regulations appropriate that the Roe 
Court may have struck down.  Rather than place regulations in the trimester 
framework, in which almost all regulations in the first trimester would not be upheld, 
the Court held that “only where state regulation imposes an undue burden on a 
woman’s ability to make [decisions regarding abortion] does the power of the State 
reach into the heart of the liberty protected by the Due Process Clause.”56  The Court 
found that an undue burden exists when “a state regulation has the purpose or effect 
of placing a substantial obstacle in the path of a woman seeking an abortion of a 
nonviable fetus” and found this statute is “invalid because the means chosen by the 
State to further the interest in potential life must be calculated to inform the woman’s 
free choice, not hinder it.”57  Thus, under Casey, a statute that places substantial 
obstacles in the path of woman’s choice “cannot be considered a permissible means 
of serving its legitimate ends.”58 
The Court found that the provisions at issue in this case all passed the undue 
burden test, with the exception of the spousal notification provision.  The outdated 
and misogynistic view that “a woman had no legal existence separate from her 
husband” was rejected by the Court.59  It held that “women do not lose their 
constitutionally protected liberty when they marry.”60  Instead, 
 
The marital couple is not an independent entity with a mind and heart of 
its own, but an association of two individuals each with a separate 
intellectual and emotional makeup.  If the right of privacy means anything, 
                                                          
51  Id. 
52  Id. 
53  Id. 
54  Casey, 505 U.S. at 870 (citing Roe, 410 U.S. at 163). 
55  Id. 
56  Id. at 874 (emphasis added).  See Hodgson v. Minnesota, 497 U.S. 417, 458–59 (1990) (O’Connor, J., 
concurring in part and concurring in the judgment in part); Ohio v. Akron Center for Reproductive Health, 497 
U.S. 502, 519–20 (1990) (opinion of Kennedy, J.)). 
57  Casey, 505 U.S. at 925. 
58  Id. at 878. 
59  Id. at 897. 
60  Id. at 898. 
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it is the right of the individual, married or single, to be free from 
unwarranted governmental intrusion into matters so fundamentally 
affecting a person as the decision whether to bear or beget a child.61 
 
The decision of Casey was ultimately a compromise: the Court rejected Roe’s 
rigid trimester framework in favor of the more malleable undue burden test, but it 
upheld the essential holding of Roe, maintaining that a woman had a constitutional 
right to an abortion, and solidified the Roe decision as legal precedent, thus affording 
Roe greater protection from future legal challenges.  Though the Roe framework was 
revised to allow greater opportunities for states to protect the life of the unborn, it 
also affirmed a woman’s right to decide whether to carry a pregnancy to term.  Under 
Casey, “states can protect potential life by persuading a woman to carry a pregnancy 
to term, but may not do so by obstructing her access to abortion.”62  The undue burden 
test ultimately “imposed crucial restrictions on the means by which the government 
could protect fetal life.”63 
The Casey court placed great emphasis on the precedent of Roe and the negative 
implications, for both society and the Court, that would occur if Roe were overturned, 
noting that generations of women have “come of age free to assume Roe’s concept 
of liberty in defining the capacity of women to act in society, and to make 
reproductive decisions.”64  Women have built their lives around decisions regarding 
reproduction and family planning, and the “ability of women to participate equally in 
the economic and social life of the Nation has been facilitated by their ability to 
control their reproductive lives.”65  We must live in a society that continues to allow 
women this freedom. 
 
3. AFTER CASEY 
 
After Casey, the Supreme Court applied the undue burden test three times.  The 
first case upheld a Montana requirement that abortions can only be performed by 
physicians.66  The Court held that the law did not create a substantial obstacle to 
abortion and also that the State may impose this type of regulation, even without 
medical evidence that it would be necessary, stating “the Constitution gives the States 
broad latitude to decide that particular functions may be performed only by licensed 
professionals, even if an objective assessment might suggest that those same tasks 
could be performed by others.”67 
The other two cases dealt with a specific procedure that has been known as the 
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partial-birth abortion, though the Court’s decisions came down differently.  The first, 
Stenberg v. Carhart, involved a Nebraska law which essentially banned physicians 
from performing partial-birth abortions, by making it a felony to perform this type of 
procedure, with an exception in cases where it would be necessary to save the life of 
the mother.68  The Supreme Court held that the law was unconstitutional for two 
reasons.  First, the law had the “effect of placing a substantial obstacle in the path of 
a woman seeking an abortion of a nonviable fetus" by encompassing within its 
statutory definition not only partial-birth abortion, but also the abortion procedure 
most commonly used during the second trimester of pregnancy—dilation and 
evacuation (“D&E”).69  Second, the exception within the Nebraska statute providing 
only for saving the life of the mother was too narrow.  The statute must have a health 
exception that allows for the partial-birth abortion procedure if necessary to preserve 
the life or health of the mother.  
The second case, Gonzales v. Carhart, was upheld by the Supreme Court seven 
years later.70  In response to Stenberg, Congress passed the Partial-Birth Abortion 
Ban Act of 2003.71  The Supreme Court deemed the language of the Act to be more 
specific and precise than the language of the Nebraska statute in Stenberg, as it 
prohibited only partial-birth abortion and did not encompass the commonly used 
D&E procedure.  The Act also contained an exception if necessary to save the life of 
the mother, though notably did not include the health component.  Further, the 
Supreme Court applied the undue burden test from Casey, finding that, based on 
Congress’s stated reasons for the Act and description of the prohibited abortion 
procedure, that the purpose was to: (1) “express[] respect for the dignity of human 
life” and (2) “protect[] the integrity and ethics of the medical profession.”72  The 
Court held that: 
 
Where it has a rational basis to act, and it does not impose an undue burden, 
the State may use its regulatory power to bar certain procedures and 
substitute others, all in furtherance of its legitimate interests in regulating 
the medical profession in order to promote respect for life, including life 
of the unborn.73 
 
The Court then determined that the Act did not impose an undue burden by barring 
partial-birth abortion.74  The Court explained that “the Act would be unconstitutional, 
under precedents we here assume to be controlling, if it subject[ed] [women] to 
significant health risks.”75  However, the Court noted “documented medical 
disagreement whether the Act's prohibition would ever impose significant health 
                                                          
68  Stenberg v. Carhart, 530 U.S. 914 (2000). 
69  Id. at 938. 
70  Gonzales v. Carhart, 550 U.S. 124 (2007). 
71  18 U.S.C. § 1531. 
72  Gonzales, 550 U.S. at 156–57. 
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75  Id. at 161 (alteration in original) (internal quotation marks omitted).  
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risks,”76 and held that this medical uncertainty foreclosed facially invalidating the act 
based on an undue burden: 
 
Medical uncertainty does not foreclose the exercise of legislative power in 
the abortion context any more than it does in other contexts.  The medical 
uncertainty over whether the Act's prohibition creates significant health 
risks provides a sufficient basis to conclude in this facial attack that the 
Act does not impose an undue burden.77 
 
After Gonzales, many assumed the undue burden framework from Casey “meant 
little more than rational basis deference to legislative decision making.”78  The 
Supreme Court appeared to be moving in a direction that would be more open to 
upholding limitations and restrictions to abortion.  Few were confident that the Court 
would respond to laws more strictly regulating abortion and challenging women’s 
access to abortion clinics.  
However, in 2016, there appeared to be a slight resurgence in the judicial 
protection afforded to women seeking abortions.  Whole Woman’s Health v. 
Hellerstedt involved a Texas statute containing various provisions related to 
abortion.79  The first challenged provision required a physician performing an 
abortion to have admitting privileges at a hospital within thirty miles of the location 
where the abortion would be performed.  The second provision required all abortion 
clinics to comply with standards set for ambulatory surgical centers.  The stated 
purpose of these provisions was to raise “the standard and quality of care for women 
seeking abortions and [to] protect the health and welfare of women seeking 
abortions.”80  Notably, these requirements would leave the entire state of Texas with 
only seven or eight functioning abortion facilities. 
 The Court held in a 5-3 decision that the two provisions at issue were 
unconstitutional because each provision placed an undue burden on a woman’s 
access to abortion.81  Though the State has a “legitimate interest in seeing to it that 
abortion, like any other medical procedure, is performed under circumstances that 
insure maximum safety for the patient,” a State cannot enact legislation which places 
a substantial obstacle in the path of a woman’s choice in order to serve that legitimate 
interest.82  Under Casey, the relevant inquiry is whether the burden imposed on 
abortion access is “undue” and thus the courts are required to perform a balancing 
                                                          
76  Id. at 162. 
77  Id. at 163–64.  
78  Greenhouse & Siegel, supra note 62. 
79  Whole Woman’s Health v. Hellerstedt, 136 S. Ct. 2292 (2016). 
80  Id. at 2303. 
81  The decision in Whole Woman’s Health was 5-3 due to the passing of Justice Scalia.  Justice Breyer 
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82  Id. at 2309 (citing Roe, 410 U.S. at 150). 
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test, considering the burdens as well as the benefits conferred by the law.  In addition, 
while courts will review legislative fact-finding with deference, the “Court retains an 
independent constitutional duty to review factual findings where constitutional rights 
are at stake.”83 
 Upon review, the Court found the evidence on record to clearly indicate that 
both provisions placed substantial obstacles in the path of a woman’s choice.  Though 
the stated purpose was to ensure the health and safety of women undergoing abortion 
procedures, the lower court “found that it brought about no such health-related 
benefits” and that “‘[t]he great weight of evidence demonstrates that, before the act’s 
passage, abortion in Texas was extremely safe with particularly low rates of serious 
complications and virtually no deaths occurring on account of the procedure.’”84  
Thus, while the state had a valid interest, the law failed to advance any such interest. 
 Specifically, the purpose of the admitting privileges provision was to “help 
ensure that women have easy access to a hospital should complications arise during 
an abortion procedure.”85  However, the evidence included the following: 
 
 In the first trimester, when over 90% of abortions occur, 
the highest complication rate was less than one-quarter of 
1%. 
 A study conclusion finding the incidence of complications 
during abortions was 2.1% and the incidence of 
complications requiring hospital admission was 0.23%. 
 In respect to surgical abortion patients who do suffer 
complications requiring hospitalization, most of these 
complications occur in the days after the abortion, not on 
the spot; these women will likely seek medical attention at 
the nearest hospital.86 
 
Similarly, the evidence in regard to the surgical center requirement indicated that 
the provision “does not benefit patients and is not necessary.”87  The lower court 
noted that women “will not obtain better care or experience more frequent positive 
outcomes at an ambulatory surgical center as compared to a previously licensed 
facility.”88  In fact, many procedures that took place outside of hospitals, such as 
colonoscopies and liposuction, are more dangerous than abortion.  Yet, Texas did not 
apply its surgical-center requirements to those procedures.89 
The Court also looked to the effect of these provisions on Texan women’s access 
to abortion clinics.  In addition to the closure of the majority of abortion clinics in the 
state, the surgical-center requirement would mean two million women of 
reproductive age would be living more than fifty miles from the nearest abortion 
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673, 684 (W.D. Tex. 2014)). 
85  Whole Woman’s Health, 136 S. Ct. at 2311. 
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87  Id. at 2315. 
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clinic.90  This would force women to travel far distances only to arrive at facilities 
that are overcrowded and, by inference, providing a lower quality of care.  In her 
concurrence, Justice Ginsburg wrote that laws like these Texas provisions that “‘do 
little or nothing for health, but rather strew impediments to abortion’ cannot survive 
judicial inspection.”91 
The Whole Woman’s Health decision provides courts with insight into the 
identification and balancing of the burdens and benefits of health regulations that 
obstruct access to abortion.  Though the majority opinion “never explicitly states that 
Texas enacted the admitting privileges and surgical center requirements with a 
purpose to obstruct women's access to abortion, the Court's deep skepticism of the 
state's actual motivation shines through the opinion.”92  The concurrence went a step 
further, with Justice Ginsburg boldly naming the Texas statute a Targeted Regulation 
of Abortion Providers (TRAP) law, calling into question the constitutionality of other 
TRAP laws throughout the country. 
 
II. SCIENTIFIC, PHILOSOPHIC, AND PRACTICAL CONSIDERATIONS 
 
Outside the courts, abortion continues to be a controversial topic in modern day 
America.  Although it raises heated debates and sparks protests and marches, as 
previously mentioned, a significant majority of Americans actually agree that 
abortion itself should be legal under some circumstances.93  In July 2018, a Gallup 
poll asked, “Would you like to see the Supreme Court overturn its 1973 Roe versus 
Wade decision concerning abortion, or not?”94 Sixty-four percent of respondents 
answered no.95  Additionally, the statistics on abortion provide some insight into what 
exactly is being so viciously fought over: the result is smaller than one may think for 
an issue so hotly contested. 
The number of abortions has consistently decreased over time, with a steady 
decline since 1990, largely due to the increase of available contraceptives and birth 
control methods.96  The Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (“CDC”) last 
released abortion statistics in 2014, when a total of 652,639 abortions were reported.97  
Ninety-five percent of abortions were performed at the thirteenth week of gestation 
or earlier and 67% were performed at the eighth week or earlier.98  An additional 
7.2% were performed between fourteen and twenty weeks’ gestation.99  Only 1.3% 
were performed beyond twenty-one weeks.100  In 2014, 1.3% of abortions was just 
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under 8,500 total.  The vast majority of abortions, therefore, are performed within the 
first trimester.  Only 1.3% of abortions would even be affected by this Note’s 
proposed national legislation.  Further, a large percentage of those abortions 
performed after twenty-one weeks occur due to health concerns for the mother and/or 
child that could not have been foreseen prior to that time. 
 
A. THE START OF LIFE 
 
It is clear that, at a certain point of gestation, the majority of Americans agree 
that abortion should no longer be permitted.  The start of debate on abortion should 
revolve around answering this question: when does life begin?  It is a question that 
may never have a clear answer, but the answer could be dispositive on the issue.  
Once life has begun, whether as early as conception or as late as at birth, it seems that 
society would agree that an abortion should be impermissible in most circumstances.  
Thus, my analysis will begin on working towards a greater understanding of when a 
life starts and how that should impact national legislation on abortion. 
The most simplistic answer to the start of life question is conception: from the 
moment an ovum is fertilized by sperm, a life has begun.  However, even religious 
traditions opposed to abortion have difficulty ascertaining the moment of 
ensoulment.  “You might be surprised to know”, according to Daniel Sulmasy, a 
Catholic bioethicist and Director of the Program on Medicine and Religion at the 
University of Chicago, “that the Catholic Church has never dogmatically defined 
when life begins.”101  Instead, the Catholic Church’s belief that a woman should not 
interfere with her pregnancy focuses more on the knowledge of potential life, not on 
knowledge of when life begins. 
In the past few decades, much has been made about the first twenty-four to forty-
eight hours post-conception.  First, many embryologists and medical or scientific 
institutions, including the American College of Pediatricians, conclude that a “unique 
human life starts when the sperm and egg bind to each other in a process of fusion of 
their respective membranes and a single hybrid cell called a zygote, or one-cell 
embryo, is created.”102  This process of fertilization may take twenty-four hours to 
complete.  Though not a focus of this Note, this view of the start of life could have 
an impact on discussions regarding emergency contraception, such as Plan B, and 
whether they may be considered abortion or abortion-inducing medication. 
Another scientific understanding considers fertilization an incomplete view of 
the start of life.  A fertilized egg would still not qualify as “life” until it has attached 
to the wall of the uterus.  Without the process of implantation, which can take 
anywhere from six to ten days to complete, a human life cannot have begun since it 
is the attachment to the uterus that fully completes the process of fertilization and 
begins embryonic development.103 
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The occurrence of ectopic pregnancies can be used in conjunction with this 
viewpoint.  An ectopic pregnancy occurs when the fertilized egg does not attach to 
the uterus, but instead potentially to the fallopian tube, abdominal cavity, or cervix.104  
The embryo will not be able to develop to term if this occurs.  It is estimated that 
ectopic pregnancies occur in about one of every fifty pregnancies.105  Ectopic 
pregnancies will cause the death of the mother if treatment is not provided.  Treatment 
options vary but may include medication that induces a miscarriage or the removal 
of the embryo, and possibly part of the affected fallopian tube, in a medical 
procedure.106  This specific type of failure for an embryo to attach to the uterus is 
used here to highlight the fact that the procedure to remove an embryo—which 
generally would be considered an abortion—is not determined to be an abortion in 
this context.  However, the Catholic Church maintains the position that the only 
morally acceptable approach to save a woman’s life with an ectopic pregnancy is to 
remove the entire fallopian tube.107  Though this results in reduced fertility, the 
Church contends the removal of the entire tube is morally appropriate because the 
intended result is to eliminate the cause of a life-threatening condition, with the 
secondary, unintended effect of ending the life of the embryo. 
Another interesting philosophical perspective on this issue comes from a rather 
surprising source: a Jesuit priest named Norman Ford.  In his 1988 book titled When 
Did I Begin?, Dr. Ford takes a more contemporary approach based on science, 
philosophy, history, and theology.108  His conclusion is based on the appearance of 
the “primitive streak” of embryonic development, which occurs at fourteen days.109  
Before fourteen days, an embryo is developed only to sixteen undifferentiated cells, 
which can develop into any type of cell that makes up the human body, or even not 
develop into part of the embryo at all, but would form part of the placenta.110  
However, at fourteen days, the “primitive streak appears, twinning is no longer a 
possibility, and the cells develop into particular lineages.”111  Prior to fourteen days, 
it can be argued there is no “ontological individuality”, and therefore an embryo has 
limited moral value.112  The dominant view in the ethics of stem cell research thus 
permits “the instrumental use of embryos [at this stage], in light of their relative moral 
value.”113 
                                                          
104  Ectopic Pregnancy, AM. PREGNANCY ASS’N, http://americanpregnancy.org/pregnancy-complica-
tions/ectopic-pregnancy/ (last visited March 24, 2019). 
105  Id. 
106  Id. 
107  Kathy Schiffer, When Pregnancy Goes Awry: The Moral Ending to an Ectopic Pregnancy, NAT’L 
CATHOLIC REGISTER (Nov. 17, 2015), http://www.ncregister.com/blog/kschiffer/xxxxwhen-pregnancy-goes-
awry-the-moral-ending-to-an-ectopic-pregnancy. 
108  See generally, NORMAN FORD, WHEN DID I BEGIN?: CONCEPTION OF THE HUMAN INDIVIDUAL IN 
HISTORY, PHILOSOPHY, AND SCIENCE (1988). 
109  C. Cameron & R. Williams, In the World of Dolly, When Does a Human Embryo Acquire Respect?, 
31 J. MED. ETHICS 215, 216 (2005), https://europepmc.org/backend/ptpmcrender.fcgi?ac-
cid=PMC1734124&blobtype=pdf. 
110  Id. 
111  Id. 
112  Guido de Wert & Christine Mummery, Human Embryonic Stem Cells: Research, Ethics, and Policy, 
18 HUM. REPROD., 672 (Apr. 2003), https://doi.org/10.1093/humrep/deg143. 
113  Id. 
 288 Journal of Legislation [Vol. 45:12] 
Many view viability, the point at which a fetus can survive outside the womb, as 
recognition of the existence of life.114  The leading scientific consensus on the age of 
viability is twenty-four weeks, according to most medical experts.115  However, a 
study from 2015 found that a very small percentage of babies born at twenty-two 
weeks and medically treated survived with few health problems (though the majority 
died or suffered serious health issues).116  Dr. David Burchfield, the Chief of 
Neonatology at the University of Florida stated that this study “confirms that if you 
don’t do anything, these babies will not make it, and if you do something, some of 
them will make it, [though] many who have survived have survived with severe 
handicaps.”117  This raises questions as to whether the point of viability should be 
lowered.  While the majority of infants born at twenty-two weeks will not survive, 
the potential, though unlikely, is possible. 
The point of this discussion is not to convince readers of when life begins, or at 
what point it becomes clear that abortion should not generally be permitted, but rather 
to show just how difficult it is to answer that question.  Legislation must involve line-
drawing, and that almost always means there will be some over or under inclusivity.  
The line must be drawn not arbitrarily or religiously or philosophically, but rather 
should be drawn where there is consensus among a cross-section of societal values, 
norms, and ideals that indicates a specific point at which society would choose not to 
permit abortion any longer.  This Note will argue that line should be drawn at twenty-
two weeks. 
B. SUPPORT FOR NATIONAL LEGISLATION 
 
Congress should enact national legislation permitting women in every state to 
have unfettered access to abortion until twenty-two weeks because of the wide variety 
of state rules and regulations of abortion.  Many states, most recently Iowa and Ohio 
in 2018, have introduced legislation known as “Heartbeat Bills” that allow a woman 
to obtain an abortion only prior to the detection of the fetal heartbeat.118  The problem 
with these bills is that a fetal heartbeat can be detected as early as six weeks, a time 
where many women may still not be aware they are pregnant.119  Dr. Jamila Perritt, 
a fellow with Physicians for Reproductive Health, notes that “the likelihood that an 
individual can miss her period, get a pregnancy test, then make an appointment to see 
an abortion provider, take time off of work if she's working, find child care for her 
other children, get in to get her abortion and have all of that done prior to a six-week 
time period is absolutely unrealistic and unreasonable.”120  Practical considerations 
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regarding when a woman will know she is pregnant are thus highly relevant in 
relation to the restrictions placed on a woman’s abortion rights. 
The logic of national legislation on abortion is clear by reason of consistency.  
Abortion policy generally has been left entirely to states and has produced a wide 
variety of laws, with some states taking harshly restrictive stances and others far more 
permissive ones.  Some governors have expressly stated goals to shut down every 
abortion clinic in their state.121  This creates an unstable national approach to 
abortion, with women in many states left with little to no options to obtain abortions.  
Women in states like Missouri, Kentucky, and South Dakota have only one abortion 
clinic provider in the state and would have to travel long distances of hundreds of 
miles, take time off work, and have finances for both the travel and the procedure.  
Under the undue burden test, these types of conditions should surely qualify. 
Further, a federal statute would balance the inherent unfairness created in a 
system where only those with the socio-economic means would be able to obtain an 
abortion.  Middle-to-upper-class women living in states with stricter regulations on 
abortion may be able to spend time and money to travel.  They also may be able to 
afford abortion earlier in the pregnancy, while other women struggle to fund the 
abortion before the allowable time has passed.  Further, the Hyde Amendment, passed 
soon after the Roe v. Wade decision, prohibits federal financial support for abortion, 
and only sixteen states use their own funds to pay for abortions.122  This lack of funds 
makes abortion distinctly less accessible for poor women.  Additionally, women 
living in rural areas may have a harder time accessing an abortion clinic compared 
with women in urban centers and large cities.  Only a federal statute can guarantee 
all women a minimum level of protection. 
Lastly, and most importantly, a woman’s right to obtain an abortion rests on 
almost half a century of stare decisis and national reliance.  As the Casey ruling made 
clear, stare decisis is “indispensable” unless “a prior judicial ruling should come to 
be seen so clearly as error that its enforcement was for that very reason doomed.”123  
The Court has laid out three instances where it may depart from a prior ruling: 
 
(a)  the holding has become unworkable,  
(b) legal principles have developed to such an extent that the 
holding becomes no more than a remnant of abandoned doctrine, or  
(c) factual developments leave the old rule inapplicable or 
unjustified.124   
 
Stare decisis requires that the Court not overrule a prior precedent “merely because 
Justices hostile to that decision replaced Justices who favored it.”125  Though critics 
claim the Casey Court’s rejection of the trimester framework in favor of the undue 
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burden test weakened the stare decisis argument, the Casey application of stare 
decisis is in fact “faithful to Roe because it adheres to the Roe Court’s determination 
that the Constitution protects a woman’s right to choose to have an abortion.”126  That 
is the ultimate principle safeguarded by Roe and affirmed by Casey: it “adheres to 
Roe in terms of its analysis of operative propositions, but revises the decision rules 
crafted to implement those operative propositions.”127  Stare decisis requires the 
members of the Supreme Court to uphold that essential Roe principle, whether they 
personally agree with it or not. 
Further, the Supreme Court’s decisions have national, lasting, and direct impacts 
on American lives.  As the Casey Court stated, “for two decades of economic and 
social developments, people have organized intimate relationships and made choices 
that define their views of themselves and their places in society, in reliance on the 
availability of abortion in the event that contraception should fail.”128  Even beyond 
that, women’s roles in society depend upon their ability to control their reproductive 
lives.  As stated by Susan Faludi, American journalist, author, and Pulitzer Prize 
winner, “[a]ll of women’s aspirations—whether for education, work, or any form of 
self-determination—ultimately rest on their ability to decide whether and when to 
bear children.”129  Easier and cheaper access to contraceptives affords women the 
ability to make those life decisions, and the societal goal should be to hope for a day 
when the use of contraceptives replaces the need for a woman to make the painful 
and difficult decision to obtain an abortion.  Currently, however, the United States 
has one of the highest rates of unintended pregnancy in the whole industrialized 
world.130  The reliance that women have placed on the ability to access abortion 
certainly adds to the importance of maintaining Roe in American jurisprudence. 
 
III. LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, CONSTITUTIONALITY, AND PROPOSED 
LEGISLATION 
 
A. THE FREEDOM OF CHOICE ACT AND THE PAIN-CAPABLE UNBORN CHILD 
PROTECTION ACT 
 
The Freedom of Choice Act is a bill that was introduced in the House and Senate 
in January 2004 and reintroduced in 2007.131  The goal of this legislation was to 
codify Roe v. Wade.  Earlier versions had been introduced in the 1990s, but without 
much support or attention.  The latest version was introduced in the Senate in April 
2007 by Senator Barbara Boxer, but never came to a vote.132  The bill solidifies as 
law that every woman has the fundamental right to choose to terminate a pregnancy 
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prior to fetal viability, or to terminate post-viability when necessary to protect her life 
or health.  Viability is defined as the “stage of pregnancy when, in the best medical 
judgment of the attending physician based on the particular medical facts of the case 
before the physician, there is a reasonable likelihood of the sustained survival of the 
fetus outside of the woman.”133  Noting the uncertainty involved in abortion policy 
and the desire to protect Roe, the Freedom of Choice Act ultimately focuses on 
protecting a woman’s right to make her own reproductive health care decisions, in 
consultation with family and health care providers.  This bill is clearly a left-wing 
approach to abortion legislation, with an emphasis on personal choice, liberty, and 
privacy, and with a vague definition of viability. 
By contrast, the Pain-Capable Unborn Child Protection Act is a bill that would 
ban abortion after twenty weeks of pregnancy on the (mistaken) belief that after 
twenty weeks, a fetus is capable of experiencing pain.134  The bill is also referred to 
as Micah’s Law, after six-year-old Micah Pickering was born at twenty-two weeks 
in July 2012 and was able to survive with intensive care treatment, though statistically 
the majority of babies born that prematurely will not survive.135  The bill has passed 
in the House of Representatives three times in the past five years, but has yet to pass 
the Senate.136  Most recently, it was reintroduced in the House by Arizona 
Representative Trent Franks on January 3, 2017 and passed on October 3, 2017 by a 
vote of 237-189.137  The bill was then introduced in the Senate by Senator Lindsey 
Graham of South Carolina.138  In January 2018, it failed to receive the sixty votes 
needed for cloture; there were fifty-one votes in favor, forty-six against.139  That same 
day, President Trump issued a statement expressing his administration’s support for 
the Pain-Capable Unborn Child Protection Act.140 
The bill allows for four exceptions: (1) the abortion is necessary to save the life 
of the pregnant mother; (2) the pregnancy is the result of rape, and the woman has 
obtained medical treatment and counseling for the rape; (3) the pregnancy is the result 
of reported rape or incest against a minor; and (4) in case of risk of death or 
substantial physical injury to the mother.141 
There are a few problems with this Act.  First, the bill does not include an 
exception for the general or mental health of the mother, only for death or life 
threatening physical injury.  A woman’s overall health should include conditions 
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such as mental health, drug and/or substance abuse, or the potential of physical 
complications.  For example, a pregnant woman may be diagnosed with a condition 
that could become life-threatening but whose life is not currently at risk at the time 
of the diagnosis, posing the concern that a woman must wait to be sick enough or 
have her condition worsen to a point where there is a higher risk of complications.  
While her physical health may not presently be in serious danger, a woman would be 
taking the risk that delayed treatment and exacerbation of her illness could potentially 
take her life and, with it, her child’s life.   
Second, the bill does not provide an exception for those instances where the fetus 
will not survive delivery or there are serious medical complications—such as missing 
organs, cardiac abnormalities, or lethal genetic issues—that should allow a woman 
the option of discontinuing her pregnancy.  Surely a woman who is told that her child 
will not survive outside the womb should be able to make a decision of whether she 
must carry the child to term and bury it, or terminate the pregnancy and grieve her 
loss.  The intimate nature of these decisions should leave the government cautious 
and cognizant of the reasons why women may seek abortions after twenty weeks.  
Additionally, a significant problem with the Pain-Capable Unborn Child 
Protection Act is that science does not support the fetal pain argument at twenty 
weeks.  A study by the Journal of American Medical Association from 2005 found 
that the evidence indicates that fetal perception of pain is unlikely before the third 
trimester (or at the twenty-eighth week).142  The American College of Obstetricians 
and Gynecologists also concluded that a fetus does not have the capacity to 
experience pain until after viability.143  Because pain is “an emotional and 
psychological experience that requires conscious recognition of a noxious stimulus”, 
a fetus does not have the physiological capacity to perceive pain until at least twenty-
four weeks gestation.144  Additionally, the “occurrence of intrauterine fetal movement 
is not an indication that a fetus can feel pain.”145 
The evidence concluding that the human fetus cannot feel pain at twenty weeks 
does not indicate that the desire to ban abortions at twenty weeks is not an admirable 
objective.  However, our health policies should be based on scientific fact.  Currently, 
there is no scientific confirmation or consensus that fetal pain exists at twenty weeks.  
To pass the Pain-Capable Unborn Child Protection Act would be to place the 
government’s seal of approval on the factually incorrect statement that fetuses at 
twenty weeks can experience pain. 
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B. CONSTITUTIONALITY OF FEDERAL ABORTION LEGISLATION 
 
Prior to the Court’s decision in Roe, Congress had never addressed abortion 
through legislation.  However, after Roe, abortion became a front and center social 
and political concern.  The debate shifted from the Court to state legislative bodies.  
Each state has the ability to restrict abortion as it chooses, so long as those restrictions 
comply with the Constitution and Supreme Court jurisprudence. 
In order for the federal government to pass abortion legislation, Congress must 
show it has the power to do so.  The most likely way is through the Commerce Clause: 
abortion services substantially affect interstate commerce.  Additionally, though it 
has yet to be tested, there is a potential Fourteenth Amendment argument that could 
also sustain abortion legislation.  
The congressional power to regulate interstate commerce is “complete in itself, 
may be exercised to its utmost extent, and acknowledges no limitations, other than 
[those] prescribed in the [C]onstitution.”146  Congressional regulations regarding 
purely local activities have been sustained by the Court when those activities have a 
substantial effect on interstate commerce.147  While the performance of an abortion 
is itself a local activity, the activity may still be reached by Congress because of the 
volume of abortions performed nationally and the interstate travel that occurs due to 
stark contrasts in abortion policy by neighboring states. 
The equal protection argument begins by claiming that because abortion is only 
applicable to women, abortion restrictions are a sex-based legislation and would 
therefore be viewed through intermediate scrutiny.  Abortion laws would thus have 
to “serve important governmental objectives and must be substantially related to 
achievement of those objectives.”148  As the Court found in Whole Woman’s Health, 
government restrictions on abortion are not always created to protect a woman’s 
health or fetal life, but rather to close down abortion clinics and restrict women’s 
access to abortion.  Additionally, when a state chooses to restrict abortion access, the 
number of abortions may not actually decrease.  Instead, the state may have just 
increased the number of unsafe abortions that will be performed.  While states may 
have legitimate purposes for enacting abortion restrictions, the means taken must 
effectuate that purpose.149  Unfortunately, there are “factors that point to abortion 
restrictions being a product of gender stereotypes.”150  The only time a state has the 
ability to co-opt a person’s body and force a body to sustain and support another, is 
in the abortion context and thus only women are being controlled by the state in this 
way.151  Potentially, prior to viability, a state’s interest has much less to do with 
protecting a potential life and more to do with reinforcing gender roles and co-opting 
female bodies.152  
Abortion restrictions may presumptively violate the Equal Protection Clause.  A 
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state carries the burden of proving the validity of their abortion restrictions through 
evidence of the following sort: 
 
By showing that the state does all in its power to promote the welfare of 
unborn life by noncoercive means, supporting those women who do wish 
to become mothers so that they are able to bear and raise healthy children; 
by demonstrating that the sacrifices the state exacts of women on behalf of 
the unborn are in fact commensurate with those it exacts of men - and the 
community in general - to promote the welfare of future generations; and, 
even, by showing that the state is ready to compensate women for the 
impositions and opportunity costs of bearing a child they do not wish to 
raise.153 
 
Women build their lives around the ability to make decisions about pregnancy.  
By restricting access to abortion, the state “conscripts women’s bodies into its 
service, forcing women to continue their pregnancies, suffer the pains of childbirth, 
and in most instances, provide years of maternal care.”154  The assumption that 
women can be forced to “accept the ‘natural’ status and incidents of motherhood 
rest[s] upon a conception of women’s roles” that triggers the protection of the Equal 
Protection Clause.155 
Though the Equal Protection argument has not yet been tested, it raises valuable 
points about women’s roles in society, the reasonableness of a state overriding bodily 
autonomy, and the legitimacy of state means to restrict abortion. 
 
 
C. PROPOSED LEGISLATION 
 
The objective of federal legislation regulating abortion should be to establish a 
floor of minimum protections.  Currently, the extreme variation of abortion access 
from state to state is confusing, unfair, and discriminatory to women in conservative 
states.  National legislation would allow individual states to be more permissive of 
abortion or apply different restrictions on abortion clinics (so long as they do not pose 
undue burdens).  For example, states may still have different requirements regarding 
waiting periods, parental consent or notification, sonogram requirements, etc.  
However, the legislation must solidify a woman’s constitutional right to abortion.  
I would propose to include the following language: 
 
(a) The decision to terminate a pregnancy prior to 22 weeks’ 
gestation of the fetus shall be solely that of the pregnant woman 
in consultation with her physician. 
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(b) After 22 weeks’ gestation, no abortion may be performed upon 
a pregnant woman, except when necessary to preserve and 
protect the life or health of the pregnant woman or in cases in 
which the fetus has life-threatening developmental defects or is 
no longer viable. 
 
I believe this language is a strong compromise that many legislators will find 
persuasive, particularly when faced with the alternative of waiting for the Supreme 
Court to make its own decision regarding this issue.  The reason this proposed text 
will be more successful than the previous federal abortion legislation bills is two-
fold. 
First, the language removes any reference to fetal pain.  As discussed above, the 
fetal pain argument is unsupported and should not be the basis for abortion 
restrictions.  Instead of having a fetal perspective of abortion, the focus of the 
language is on woman’s health and reproductive decisions.  The bill includes 
exemptions beyond twenty-two weeks for life and health risks for the mother and/or 
fetus, and allows for abortions for any reason prior to twenty-two weeks.  This 
language is similar to the Freedom of Choice Act in the sense that it focuses on a 
woman’s personal choice and allows for life and health exemptions.  This will appeal 
to more liberal Congress members, who approach the abortion issue from the lens of 
the liberty, privacy, and personal choice of women. 
Second, the language places a strict ban on elective abortion after the fetus has 
reached twenty-two weeks.  This is a specific time deadline and is two weeks earlier 
than the current scientific understanding of viability.  The proposed bill makes clear 
that the only exceptions beyond twenty-two weeks are for the life and health of the 
mother, or serious medical deficiencies for the fetus.  For example, this would include 
a situation in which a fetus is diagnosed with a fatal illness or a condition with a 
profoundly poor prognosis, in which the decision to terminate a pregnancy is deeply 
personal and difficult.  It would also include situations where a woman is diagnosed 
with a life-threatening condition during her pregnancy in which her life is at 
significant risk without medical intervention, and a decision must be made regarding 
her own health and the health and life of her fetus, which again, is profoundly intimate 
and is best left with a woman, her doctor, and loved ones.  This proposed bill is also 
similar to the Pain-Capable Unborn Child Protection Act in the sense that it places a 
strict time limit on which women may exercise their right to abortion freely and 
without undue interference.  This aspect will appeal to more conservative legislators, 
who approach the abortion issue from the lens of protection of potential fetal life.   
Considering that only about 1% of abortions occur after twenty-two weeks, this 
bill is not changing the current state of abortion.156  Rather, it is solidifying in 
legislation the system Americans already accept.  Women have already been granted 
a federal right to make personal reproductive decisions.  That right must be cemented 
by Congress before it reaches the Supreme Court, which cannot be held politically 
accountable to the public at large and could upend the entire system of reproductive 
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healthcare.  
 
CONCLUSION 
 
 Within the month of this writing, New York passed its own state law protecting 
a woman’s right to choose to terminate her pregnancy and codified Roe v. Wade.  The 
response to this legislation has been both positive and negative.  Supporters of choice 
declare this legislation as a victory for women’s rights.157  Critics claim that this 
allows women to obtain an abortion any time, for any reason up until birth.158  This 
piece of legislation is very similar to what I propose Congress pass and, 
understandably, I imagine a national public response will be just as heated. 
 New York Governor Andrew Cuomo expressed his stance on the bill in an 
opinion piece for the New York Times after President Trump attacked the bill during 
the State of the Union address on February 5, 2019.159  The Reproductive Health Act 
was a direct response to the “continual anxiety that the Court will overrule the Roe 
precedent.”160  The New York bill “guarantees a woman’s right to abortion in the first 
twenty-four weeks of pregnancy or when the fetus is not viable, and permits it 
afterward only when a woman’s life or health is threatened or at risk.”161  Cuomo 
dismisses those claiming the bill allows a woman to terminate her pregnancy at any 
time, citing directly to the language and affirming that late-term abortions will not 
occur unless serious medical complications arise. 
 The fear of late term abortions was the single largest criticism and concern of 
the New York bill.  However, I would argue that fear is largely unfounded.  I suspect 
it is rare that a woman wakes up after carrying a fetus for twenty-six weeks and 
decides she no longer wants to carry her baby.  By that point in a pregnancy, women 
want their children and are preparing to become mothers.  Instead, they are faced 
with painful and difficult decisions regarding their own health and the health of their 
child.  The idea that somehow a large percentage of the 1.3% of abortions that occur 
after twenty-one weeks are elective abortions is degrading and offensive to the 
majority of women and mothers. 
 However, even with backlash, the government should still solidify a woman’s 
right to choose to have an abortion prior to twenty-two weeks.  The Constitution 
guarantees the right of privacy, and nothing is more intimate and private than a 
woman’s bodily autonomy and reproductive health.  The Supreme Court has further 
guaranteed the right to obtain an abortion to women without undue governmental 
burdens prior to viability.  Additionally, the majority of the public is clearly in favor 
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of some right of choice and only a small fraction of voters take the extreme stance 
that abortion should be illegal under all circumstances.  The proposed legislation is a 
way to compromise by placing a nation-wide ban on abortion after twenty-two weeks 
(with exceptions for the life and health of the mother and fetus) while confirming that 
women have the right to abortion.  The only way to pass this type of legislation is for 
congressmen and congresswomen to see that unless they take action and compromise, 
the decision will be left to nine individuals sitting on the Supreme Court.  I do not 
underestimate how difficult this will be—and potentially—it may never be achieved.  
But if society looks to the alternative of allowing the Supreme Court to dictate 
women’s healthcare decisions, I suspect a larger number of Americans would be 
more inclined to support Congressional action.  If we wait, are we enabling five 
middle-aged men to do away with decades of precedent, leaving American women 
without the most basic, fundamental sense of personal liberty, bodily autonomy, and 
dignified privacy?  That is a chance we should not be willing to take.   
 
